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Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of local religious beliefs on organizational risk-taking behaviors using 
hedge funds as a new and unique setting. We find that local religiosity is significantly negatively 
related to both total and idiosyncratic volatilities of hedge funds during 1996-2013, even after 
controlling for endogeneity using managers’ college-location religiosity. Consistent with the 
local preference channel, the impact of local religiosity on risk-taking is only pronounced among 
funds for which local managers and investors are more important, namely semi-directional, 
young, and small funds. Further, hedge funds located in more religious counties tend to hold less 
risky stocks and diversify their stock portfolios across industries, thus contributing to lower 
hedge fund risk-taking. Overall, our evidence suggests that local religiosity may motivate hedge 
fund managers to reduce risk.   
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1. Introduction 
There has been a growing literature on the impact of local culture, particularly local 
religious beliefs, on organizational risk-taking behaviors. In general, theoretical studies predict a 
negative effect of local religiosity on organizational risk-taking based on two premises. First, 
sociologists and psychologists have long recognized that individuals are likely influenced by 
local culture and beliefs through social interactions, which in turn reinforce individual 
preferences such that they share the same identity with each other (Tajfel (1978) and Hogg and 
Abrams (1988)). Second, prior research (e.g., Osoba (2003) and Hilary and Hui (2009)) has 
established a robust association between religious beliefs and individuals’ risk aversion, likely 
due to the fact that most religions teach their followers to prioritize spiritual endeavors over 
monetary gain which typically requires taking financial risks. To the extent that local religiosity 
induced risk aversion affects an organization’s key stakeholders, local religiosity can exert a 
negative impact on organizational risk-taking behaviors.  
Despite clear theoretical predictions, the empirical evidence has provided mixed results. 
For instance,  existing literature documents that local religiosity negatively affects risk taking by 
non-financial firms (Hilary and Hui (2009)) and banks (Adhikari and Agrawal (2016b)). 
However, Shu, Sulaeman, and Yeung (2012) show that a sample of growth and aggressive 
growth mutual funds located in more religious areas tend to undertake more risk.1  
In this paper, we aim to shed light on the effect of local religiosity on organizational risk-
taking using hedge funds as a new and unique setting. Specifically, we examine whether and 
how local religious beliefs affects hedge fund managers’ risk-taking behaviors.  
                                                 
1 Shu et al. (2012) document that total religiosity is significantly positively related to mutual fund total and 
idiosyncratic risk, although they focus on the effects of different religious groups (i.e., Catholics versus Protestants) 
on mutual fund risk taking. For completeness, we also discuss different religious groups in Section 3.7. 
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We focus on hedge funds for several reasons. First, hedge funds have many unique 
features which may mitigate the potential effect of local religiosity on their risk-taking, thus 
offering an ideal setting for our purpose. For instance, compared to mutual funds, hedge fund 
managers have stronger financial incentives to make profits as they are typically paid a 
significant portion of excess returns as performance fees (e.g., 20%) in addition to fixed 
management fees. They also invest a considerable amount of personal wealth into their own 
funds. And they face extraordinary competition from their peers and are under constant pressure 
to deliver superior performance. All these features may motivate hedge fund managers to focus 
on performance-maximizing investment strategies, which are culturally invariant. In addition, 
compared to mutual funds, hedge funds have more flexibility and less constraints in risk-taking 
so that the impact of local culture on hedge fund investment decisions is likely to be minimal. In 
particular, hedge funds are lightly regulated and not required to hold diversified portfolios so 
they can take large and concentrated stakes in individual firms more easily; they also face fewer 
conflicts of interests than mutual funds who may have other business relations with the invested 
companies; and they have lock-up provisions that restrict the investors from withdrawing their 
principal over certain lock-up periods. Overall, these unique features make hedge funds least 
likely to be affected by local religiosity, if any. Therefore, if we document significant evidence in 
the hedge fund industry, it will provide strong support for the impact of local religious beliefs on 
organizational risk-taking.  
Second, despite the tremendous growth of the hedge fund industry over the past two 
decades2 and a growing literature on hedge funds, the effect of local religious beliefs, an 
important aspect of local culture, on hedge fund risk-taking behaviors has never been explored. 
                                                 
2According to Hedge Fund Research (HFR), the total assets under management (AUMs) by global hedge funds have 
increased dramatically from $50 billion in 1990 to $3 trillion in 2015. 
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Notably, while existing literature has focused on fund-, strategy-, and market-specific 
determinants of hedge fund risk-taking (e.g., Fung and Hsieh (1997), Brown, Goetzmann, and 
Park (2001), Chen (2011), Aragon and Nanda (2012), and Smith, Wang, Wang, and Zychowicz 
(2016)), human behavior is still a missing piece. This is particularly surprising given the 
importance of understanding the risk-taking incentives of hedge funds, which are frequently 
blamed for causing systemic risk during financial crises such as the 1998 Long Term Capital 
Management debacle and 2007-2009 financial crisis. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
human behavior plays an important role during financial crises.3 Our paper fills the gap in the 
literature by investigating the role of one specific aspect of human behavior, namely local 
religiosity induced risk aversion, in explaining hedge fund risk-taking.4  
Finally, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds have various investment strategies, such as 
directional, semi-directional, and non-directional strategies. While directional funds (such as 
macro) take direct market exposure and risk, semi-directional funds (such as equity hedge and 
event-driven) tend to diversify market risk by taking both long and short, diversified positions, 
and non-directional funds (such as equity market neutral) aim to minimize market risk altogether. 
These strategies also differ significantly in the roles hedge funds’ key local stakeholders may 
play in determining hedge fund risk-taking. For instance, Sialm, Sun, and Zheng (2014) suggest 
that semi-directional funds are most likely to be affected whereas directional funds are least 
likely to be impacted by local investor preferences. Therefore, it would be interesting to see 
whether local religiosity has different effects on the risk-taking behaviors of various hedge fund 
                                                 
3 For instance, in a testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on hearing on hedge funds, Lo (2008) 
attributes financial crises to be “a consequence of the interactions between hardwired human behavior and the 
unfettered ability to innovate, compete, and evolve.” 
4 One caveat is that religiosity might have implications other than risk aversion, thus resulting in a measurement 
error. However, as argued in Adhikari and Agrawal (2016b), any resulting attenuation bias should only bias us 
against finding significant results. 
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strategies, especially given that Shu et al. (2012) only focus on a sample of growth and 
aggressive growth mutual funds. 
To the extent that local religiosity may affect the risk preferences of hedge fund managers 
and investors, we hypothesize that hedge funds located in more religious areas are less likely to 
take risk. For instance, hedge fund managers are often local or conform to local cultural and 
religious forms. Moreover, the literature on local bias suggests that hedge funds tend to hold 
more local stocks in their portfolios (Teo (2009)), and they can benefit from catering to local 
investor preferences (Sialm et al. (2014)). As a result, higher local religiosity may induce higher 
risk aversion of hedge funds’ managers and investors, thus resulting in lower risk-taking. The 
alternative hypothesis is that local religiosity has no effect on the risk-taking behaviors of hedge 
funds due to their unique features as discussed earlier.  
Using a sample of 7,033 hedge funds from the HFR database and county-level religiosity 
data during 1996-2013, we find that local religiosity is significantly negatively related to hedge 
funds’ total and idiosyncratic return volatilities. This result appears to be primarily driven by the 
semi-directional strategies such as equity hedge and event-driven, which diversify market risk by 
taking both long and short, diversified positions.  
While our results suggest a negative effect of local religiosity on hedge fund risk-taking 
(the “local religiosity impact” hypothesis), they may also be driven by endogeneity due to 
reverse causality in the sense that more risk-averse managers tend to choose funds located in 
areas with more religious populations (the “self-selection” hypothesis), or due to omitted 
variables that are correlated with both local religiosity and hedge fund risk-taking. We use a 
variety of control variables in our regressions and include year and investment strategy fixed 
effects to control for unobservable, strategy-related, omitted variables. To further establish 
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causality, we employ several additional tests. First, we construct two instrumental variables 
following Hilary and Hui (2009), i.e., the three-year lagged local religiosity and three-year 
lagged total county population, and undertake an instrumental variables (IV) regression analysis. 
Second, we follow Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) and perform the dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. Our results remain robust after controlling 
for endogeneity using both IV and GMM estimations.  
To further alleviate concerns over reverse causality, we use local religiosity of hedge 
fund managers’ undergraduate college locations to proxy for their innate religious beliefs and 
conduct a horse-race analysis on the effects of college- versus fund-location religiosity on hedge 
fund risk-taking. Our results show that fund-location religiosity indeed dominates college-
location religiosity in mitigating managers’ risk-taking. And this effect is more pronounced if the 
college location is in a different region than the fund location. While we cannot completely rule 
out the “self-selection” hypothesis, these tests provide additional evidence that after controlling 
for reverse causality, local religiosity has a significant negative impact on managers’ risk-taking 
behaviors, thus lending further support for the “local religiosity impact” hypothesis.  
Further, we find that the risk mitigating effect of local religiosity exists for both financial 
crisis and non-crisis periods but appears to be stronger during crisis periods, when it is most 
important and needed, i.e., during time periods with excessive risk-taking and uncertainty. The 
results are also robust to excluding hedge funds located in New York (the top one state of hedge 
fund concentration, which constitutes 38% of our sample funds), suggesting that our findings are 
not driven by the state with the greatest hedge fund concentration. However, we do not find that 
local religiosity affects hedge fund performance as proxied by the Nine-Factor (a combination of 
Carhart (1997) four factors and Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors) Alpha.  
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We next explore the local preference channel through which local religiosity may affect 
hedge fund risk-taking. The evidence suggests that the effect of local religiosity on the risk 
preferences of local managers and investors may, at least partially, help explain our findings. 
Specifically, we find that the negative relation between local religiosity and risk-taking is only 
pronounced among funds for which local managers and clients are economically more important, 
i.e., semi-directional (such as equity hedge) rather than directional (such as macro), young rather 
than old, and small rather than large funds.  
Finally, analyses of hedge fund holdings show that funds located in counties with higher 
religiosity ratios tend to hold less risky stocks and diversify their stock portfolios across 
industries, thus contributing to lower hedge fund return volatilities. 
We make several important contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge our study is the first in the hedge fund literature to examine the effect of local culture, 
particularly local religious beliefs, on hedge fund risk-taking behaviors. Second, this paper is part 
of a growing literature on the effects of local religiosity on organizational risk-taking (e.g., 
Hilary and Hui (2009), Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011), Shu et al. (2012), and Adhikari and 
Agrawal (2016b)) and involvement in questionable activities (e.g., Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 
(2009), Dyreng, Mayew, and Williams (2012), McGuire, Omer, and Sharp (2012), Boone, 
Khurana, and Raman (2013), Callen and Fang (2015), and Adhikari and Agrawal (2016a)).5  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on portfolio location and home bias. While prior studies 
examine the potential advantages (e.g., lower monitoring and information acquisition costs) of a 
                                                 
5 Economists and sociologists have long documented significant effects of religious beliefs on various social 
behaviors: marriage (Lehrer and Chiswick (1993)), divorce (Heaton and Pratt (1990)), crime (Evans, Cullen, 
Dunaway, and Burton JR. (1995)), suicide (Bainbridge (1989)), and drug and alcohol consumption (Cochran and 
Akers (1989)). Until more recently, financial researchers have examined the effects of religion primarily at the 
macro level, such as on government quality (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999)), creditor 
protection (Stulz and Williamson (2003)), and economic growth (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003)). 
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fund due to the geographical proximity to the stocks in its portfolio (Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) and (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), we document that location may also affect hedge 
fund behaviors through local culture.  
It is worth noting that our paper differs from, as well as complements, Shu et al. (2012) in 
several aspects. First and foremost, unlike Shu et al. (2012) who suggest a positive relation 
between local religiosity and mutual fund risk-taking, we document that local religiosity 
mitigates hedge fund risk-taking, and this negative relation is primarily driven by semi-
directional strategies. We also show that the difference could be attributed to fund styles.6 
Second, we establish causality by running a horse-race analysis between managers’ college- and 
fund-location religiosity, to the extent that the former captures managers’ innate religious beliefs 
that are formed prior to coming to the fund’s location. Finally, we show that local religiosity 
mitigates hedge fund risk-taking at both the individual stock and portfolio levels, whereas Shu et 
al. (2012) document that local religiosity only appears to affect mutual fund risk-taking at the 
portfolio level. Therefore, while Shu et al. (2012)’s results cannot be attributed to local bias, it is 
possible that our results are driven by hedge fund managers’ local preferences (Teo (2009)). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides 
summary statistics. Section 3 presents our main findings regarding the effect of local religiosity 
on hedge fund risk-taking. Section 4 explores the local preference channel through which local 
religiosity may impact hedge fund risk-taking. Section 5 examines how local religiosity affects 
hedge fund stock holdings and portfolio diversification. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6 We find that local religiosity is significantly positively related to risk-taking for the most aggressive directional 
strategies which take direct market exposure and risk, such as macro. This positive relation is indeed consistent with 
Shu et al. (2012) who use a sample of growth and aggressive growth mutual funds which tend to take more risk. 
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2. Data and Measures 
In this section, we first discuss our hedge fund sample and then present county-level 
religiosity and demographic data. In particular, we describe data sources, sample selection, and 
variable construction, and provide summary statistics for the key variables used in our analyses.  
 
2.1. Hedge fund sample 
Our hedge fund data come from the HFR database, which reports fund characteristics and 
operational data (including business address), along with monthly returns and AUMs. To 
mitigate survivorship bias, we include both live and graveyard funds located in the US from 
January 1994 when HFR started to track graveyard funds through December 2013. To ensure 
that the same fund does not appear multiple times in the database, we only keep funds with net 
monthly returns denominated in the US dollar. If a hedge fund has both off- and on-shore funds, 
we keep the fund with the longest return history or the largest asset size. Further, to alleviate 
backfill and incubation biases, we delete return observations of a fund prior to the date it was 
added to the database (Aggarwal and Jorion (2010)).7 As a result, our sample period is 
effectively from 1996 to 2013. We also require a fund to have at least 18 monthly returns during 
the sample period. Finally, we keep funds with the following primary investment strategies: 
Equity Hedge, Event-Driven, Fund of Funds, Macro, and Relative Value. Our final sample 
contains 7,033 hedge funds, of which 2,161 are live and 4,872 are graveyard funds. 
Since our focus is on the hedge fund risk-taking behaviors, we estimate two risk 
measures for individual funds every year using a 24-month rolling window:8 (1) Total Risk, 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, we follow Fung and Hsieh (2000), Teo (2011), and Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) and delete the 
first 18 months of returns of all individual hedge funds in our sample, and our results remain robust. 
8 Our results are robust if we use an 18, 36, or 60-month rolling window in constructing hedge fund risk measures.  
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defined as the standard deviation of monthly hedge fund returns; and (2) Idiosyncratic Risk, 
calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the following nine-factor model, in 
which we combine the Carhart (1997) four factors and Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors:  
, , , , ,  
, , ,  
 	 , , ,                    (1) 
where ,  is the month-t return on fund i in excess of the one-month T-bill rate;  is the 
market return in excess of the one-month T-bill rate;  is the small-minus-big size factor, 
 is the high-minus-low book-to-market factor;  is the momentum factor;  is a 
bond market factor defined as the return spread of the Barclays Capital 7-10 year Treasury index 
and the one-month T-bill rate;  is a credit spread factor defined as the return spread of 
the Barclays Capital Corporate Bond Baa Index and the 7-10 year Treasury index; and , 
, and  are the trend-following factors of Fung and Hsieh (2001) for bonds, 
currencies, and commodities, respectively.9  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that an average hedge fund in our sample has monthly total risk 
of 3% and idiosyncratic risk of 1%. This indicates that a large proportion (33.3%) of total hedge 
fund risk is due to idiosyncratic risk. We also observe substantial variations of both risk 
measures in the full sample. For instance, the 75th percentile is 0.04 (0.02) for total 
(idiosyncratic) risk, which is considerably larger than the 25th percentile of 0.01 (0.00). 
                                                 
9 We thank Ken French and David Hsieh for providing their risk factors on their respective websites:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html and http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/ 
Datalibrary/ TF-FAC.xls. 
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In our analyses, we control for various hedge fund characteristics that are shown in prior 
literature (e.g.,Chen (2011) and Smith et al. (2016)) to affect hedge fund risk-taking. Panel B of 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of these fund characteristics (see Appendix A for variable 
definitions). Approximately 58% of all hedge funds in our sample use leverage (leverage), and 
87% have a management fee structure that includes a high watermark provision 
(high_watermark). On average, the AUMs of a hedge fund (fund_assets) are $157.52 million; the 
AUMs of a hedge fund firm (firm_assets) are $10 billion; the lockup period (lockup) is 4.65 
months; the advance notice period required for asset redemptions from a fund (advance_notice) 
is 43 days; annual management fee (management_fee) is 1.44%; annual incentive fee 
(incentive_fee) is 16.89%; and the minimum investment required for a fund 
(minimum_investment) is $1.3 million. Further, only 13% of our sample funds specify a hurdle 
rate (hurdle_rate), but almost all (92%) of the funds perform an annual audit (audit).  
 
2.2. Religiosity and demographic data  
We collect religiosity data from the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). The 
data set, initially constructed by the Glenmary Research Center and the Association of 
Statisticians of American Religious Bodies and distributed by the ARDA website, contains 
county-level religion statistics for 133 Judeo-Christian church bodies every 10 years. Our main 
variable of interest is the county-level religiosity ratio (REL), calculated as the total number of 
adherents of all congregations to the total population in the county as reported by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. Following prior studies (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Hilary and Hui 
(2009), and Shu et al. (2012)), for our sample period of 1996-2013, we linearly interpolate 
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religiosity ratios between the survey years of 1990, 2000, and 2010 and use the data in 2010 to 
set the values for the 2011-2013 period. 10  
Panel C of Table 1 indicates that an average hedge fund is located in a county with 54% 
religious population, which is similar to the U.S. average (55.64%). There also exists wide 
variation in religiosity ratios in our sample. For instance, the 75th percentile of religiosity ratio is 
0.62, while the 25th percentile is 0.44.  
We also control for a broad set of demographic variables in our analyses as in previous 
literature (e.g., Iannaccone (1998), Hilary and Hui (2009), and Shu et al. (2012)). Specifically, 
we obtain the county-level demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau for the three years 
1990, 2000, and 2010. Appendix A also provides definitions of these demographic variables.  
Panel D of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of county-level demographic variables. 
For the county where a typical hedge fund is located, the median age of the population (age) is 
36 years, the fraction of population who are 25 years or older with a Bachelor’s, postgraduate, or 
professional degree (edu) is 42.63%, the mean per capita personal income (income) is $58,953, 
the total county population (ttlpop) is 1.87 million, the ratio of male to female population (mf) is 
0.92, the proportion of minorities in the total county population (minority) is 38%, and the 
fraction of married to total households (married) is 16%. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients among all of the key variables. Specifically, 
we find that local religiosity (REL) is significantly negatively correlated with both total and 
idiosyncratic risk. The correlation coefficients provide preliminary evidence that hedge funds 
located in more religious counties are more likely to undertake lower total and idiosyncratic risk.  
                                                 
10 As a robustness check, we do not linearly interpolate religiosity data and find similar results. 
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3. Empirical Analysis: Local Religiosity and Hedge Fund Risk-taking 
This section presents our main findings regarding the impact of local religious beliefs on 
hedge fund managers’ risk-taking behaviors. We start with a portfolio analysis of excess fund 
risk measures sorted by local religiosity in Section 3.1, and then perform panel and Fama-
MacBeth regressions in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 examines the relation between local religiosity 
and hedge fund risk-taking across various fund investment strategies. In Section 3.4, we attempt 
to address potential endogeneity concerns using instrumental variables (IV) regressions, dynamic 
panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, and a horse-run analysis of managers’ 
college- vs. fund-location religiosity. Section 3.5 performs additional robustness tests. Section 
3.6 examines whether local religiosity affects hedge fund performance. Finally, we discuss the 
results across different religious groups in Section 3.7.   
 
3.1. Portfolio analysis: hedge fund risk-taking sorted by local religiosity 
To investigate the relation between local religiosity and hedge fund risk-taking, we first 
conduct a portfolio analysis. Each year we sort hedge funds into quintiles based on their local 
religiosity ratios. To control for investment strategy, we adjust both risk measures of a fund by 
subtracting the annual median values within the fund’s investment strategy to obtain excess total 
and idiosyncratic risk measures. We then calculate the annual means of these measures for each 
quintile, and report the time-series averages. We also report the differences between the top and 
bottom religiosity quintiles and the associated t-statistics. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Table 3 reports the results. The mean excess Total Risk appears to decrease with local 
religiosity, although not monotonically. The difference between the highest and lowest 
religiosity quintiles is -0.27%, which is statistically and economically significant. We observe a 
similar pattern for the mean excess Idiosyncratic Risk, although the magnitude is smaller. Taken 
together, our portfolio analysis suggests that indeed, hedge funds located in an area with more 
religious populations are associated with lower total and idiosyncratic risk-taking. As these fund 
managers typically hold an under-diversified wealth portfolio with a disproportionately greater 
weight invested in the fund they work for (e.g., through either human capital or monetary 
investment), total and idiosyncratic risk-taking can have substantial impacts on their wealth and 
utility.  
 
3.2. Regression analysis of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity 
To control for a variety of fund characteristics and county-level demographic variables 
that may affect fund risk-taking, we perform multivariate regressions of hedge fund risk 
measures on local religiosity as follows: 
, , , , ,      (2) 
where ,  is the risk-taking measure (total or idiosyncratic risk) of hedge fund i in year t, 
,  is the county-level local religiosity ratio of fund i in year t, and X contains all control 
variables such as fund characteristics and demographic factors, as well as various fixed effects. If 
local religiosity induced risk aversion leads to lower risk-taking of hedge funds, a negative 
coefficient ( ) is expected; otherwise an insignificant	  is anticipated, suggesting that local 
religion has no effect on hedge fund risk-taking behaviors. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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In Panel A of Table 4, we run panel regressions including both strategy and year fixed 
effects to control for any unobservable, omitted, investment strategy-specific factors and 
variations due to time.11 Note that all variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels 
and P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors.  We find a significant 
and negative coefficient on REL for total risk. Economically speaking, a one standard deviation 
increase in REL (0.11) leads to a reduction of 0.09% in total risk, which represents 2.9% of the 
standard deviation in total risk. For idiosyncratic risk, a one-standard-deviation increase in REL 
translates into a decrease of approximately 0.03% in idiosyncratic risk, representing 1.65% of the 
standard deviation in idiosyncratic risk.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents Fama-MacBeth (Fama and MacBeth (1973)) regression 
results. Specifically, we run cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund risk measures on local 
religiosity each year, and then calculate the time-series averages of regression coefficients. The 
table shows that local religiosity is significantly negatively related to both total and idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Indeed, both the statistical significance and economic magnitude of the coefficients 
on REL are substantially improved relative to those panel regression results. More specifically, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in REL (0.11) leads to a reduction of 0.17% and 0.07% in total 
and idiosyncratic risk, respectively, which are equivalent to 5.5% and 3.3% of the standard 
deviation in total and idiosyncratic risk.  
The coefficient estimates on control variables are consistent with prior literature (e.g., 
Chen (2011)). Larger funds or bigger firms are less likely to take risk. The minimum investment 
is negatively related to fund volatilities. Higher management fee encourages greater risk-taking, 
whereas higher incentive fee induces managers to undertake more idiosyncratic risk. In addition, 
                                                 
11 As a robustness check, we following Shu et al. (2012) and include (strategy × year) fixed effects in all regressions 
to control for any unobservable, omitted variables that are specific to each strategy and year, and find similar results. 
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hedge funds with high water mark provisions, longer lockup periods, the use of leverage, and an 
annual audit tend to take more risk. Regarding the county-level demographic variables, we find 
that hedge funds located in counties with older population, lower education level, higher income, 
lower total population, higher male to female ratio, less minority population, and less married 
households appear more likely to take higher total or idiosyncratic risk. 
In sum, the regression results show that hedge funds located in counties with higher 
religiosity ratios are more likely to undertake lower total and idiosyncratic risk, indicating that 
risk aversion induced by local religiosity may lead to lower risk-taking even in the highly 
competitive hedge fund industry.  
 
3.3. The relation between local religiosity and hedge fund risk-taking by investment strategy  
In this section we investigate whether our main findings change across various hedge 
fund investment strategies. Some funds are willing to take direct market exposure and risk 
(directional strategies), such as managed futures, global macro, and emerging market funds. 
Some diversify market risk by taking both long and short, diversified positions (semi-directional 
strategies), such as fund-of-funds, equity hedge, event-driven, and multi-strategy funds. Others 
aim to minimize market risk altogether (non-directional strategies), such as equity market 
neutral, fixed income arbitrage, and convertible arbitrage funds.  
We divide our full sample into five subsamples based on the investment strategies 
provided by the HFR database: (1) equity hedge, (2) event-driven, (3) fund of funds, (4) macro, 
and (5) relative value, and perform subsample analysis. The equity hedge, event-driven, and fund 
of funds (strategies (1) through (3)) are semi-directional strategies that rank in the middle 
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regarding risk level; macro (strategy (4)) is the directional strategy that involves the greatest risk; 
and relative value (strategy (5)) is the non-directional strategy that is the least aggressive.  
In untabulated tests, we conduct portfolio analysis and examine the average excess risk 
measures across quintiles of religiosity ratio for different investment strategies. We find that after 
excluding the most and least aggressive strategies (i.e., excluding strategy (4) and (5)), the mean 
values of both fund excess Total Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk decrease with religiosity, and the 
result is stronger compared to the full sample result in Table 3. For instance, the difference 
between the highest and lowest religiosity quintiles is -0.51% (t = -5.12) and -0.26% (t = -5.24) 
for mean excess Total Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk, respectively.  Overall, the portfolio result 
suggests that the negative relation between religiosity and hedge fund risk taking appears to be 
driven by the semi-directional strategies.  
To ensure the robustness of the results, we also estimate fixed effects panel and Fama-
MacBeth regressions of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity (REL) by strategy. We include 
all control variables, but only report the coefficients on REL for brevity. For panel regressions, 
we include year fixed effects for each of the five strategies, and (strategy × year) fixed effects for 
semi-directional strategies (1), (2), and (3) altogether.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Consistent with the portfolio analyses, the regression results in Table 5 show that the 
negative relation between local religiosity and hedge fund risk-taking appears to be primarily 
driven by semi-directional strategies (which account for about 70% of the sample), in particular 
equity hedge and event-driven funds. For the least aggressive non-directional strategy such as 
relative value, local religiosity does not appear to relate to hedge fund risk-taking, likely due to 
the small variation in risk levels for this least risky strategy. For the most aggressive directional 
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strategy, macro, however, local religiosity is significantly positively related to fund risk-taking. 
This result is indeed consistent with Shu et al. (2012)’s finding that the more risky growth and 
aggressive growth equity mutual funds located in more religious counties tend to take more risk. 
Overall the evidence suggests that the difference between the results of our paper and Shu et al. 
(2012) could be attributed to fund styles.12  
 
3.4. Endogeneity  
Thus far, we have documented a significant negative relation between local religious 
beliefs and hedge fund risk-taking, particularly total and idiosyncratic return volatilities. While 
our results suggest a negative effect of local religiosity on hedge fund risk-taking, they are also 
consistent with two alternative explanations. First, this negative association may be due to 
reverse causality in the sense that more risk-averse managers tend to choose funds located in 
areas with more religious populations. In particular, local culture and religious beliefs may 
attract fund managers and employees who share the same cultural background, as individuals 
prefer to work and reside in areas having local culture and beliefs with which they feel 
comfortable (Schneider (1987)). For example, Hilary and Hui (2009) show that CEOs 
consistently choose to work for employers with the same local culture. Second, the negative 
association may be driven by other unobservable factors correlated with both local religiosity 
and hedge fund risk-taking.  
To distinguish between these alternative explanations and establish causality, we have 
conducted various tests to control for potential endogeneity. For example, we use a variety of 
                                                 
12 It is also worth noting that the results are indeed consistent with the local preference channel discussed later in 
Section 4. We will then discuss these results in more details. 
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control variables in our regressions and include year and investment strategy fixed effects to 
control for unobservable, strategy-related, omitted variables. We now perform several tests to 
further control for potential endogeneity including IV regressions, dynamic panel GMM 
estimation, and a horse-race analysis between college- and fund-location religiosity. 
 
3.4.1. IV regressions 
Following prior literature such as Hilary and Hui (2009), we identify two instrumental 
variables for our endogenous variable (REL).13 The first instrument is the 3-year lagged 
religiosity (REL_lag3). To the extent that local religiosity remains stable over time, historical 
religiosity is expected to be positively related to current religiosity (the relevance criterion). 
However, there is no obvious reason as to why local religiosity three years ago would impact 
current risk-taking by hedge funds, other than through the effects of current religiosity (the 
exclusion criterion). The second instrument used is the total population of a hedge fund’s local 
county lagged by three years, ttlpop_lag3 (Hilary and Hui (2009)). While historical county 
population is highly likely to be related to current religiosity ratio (the relevance criterion), the 3-
year lagged population should not have any impact on hedge fund risk-taking behaviors, other 
than through current religiosity (the exclusion criterion). Since we use two instruments for one 
endogenous variable, we are able to estimate an over-identified system and conduct various 
statistical tests for instrument validity. 
In the first stage of IV regressions, we regress REL on the two instruments, along with 
various hedge fund characteristics and county-level demographic variables. In the second stage, 
                                                 
13 We use an additional instrumental variable, i.e., the median age of the county population lagged by three years, in 
the IV regressions; the results are qualitatively similar.  
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we regress various risk-taking measures on the fitted value of REL from the first stage estimation 
and all controls. We include both strategy and year fixed effects in all of our regressions.14  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 presents the IV regression results. The endogeneity tests suggest that REL is 
endogenous in predicting total and idiosyncratic risk (p-value = 0.000 in both cases). The first 
stage evidence shows that both instruments are significantly positively related to current REL 
satisfying the relevance criterion. The first stage F-test also indicates that the weak instrument 
problem is unlikely (p-value < 0.0000). The second stage p-value for Hansen J-statistic equals 
0.7114 for total risk and 0.4935 for idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, our two instruments are jointly 
exogenous and valid.  
More importantly, the second stage regression results show that REL is still significantly 
negatively related to total and idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, both the statistical significance and 
economic magnitude of the coefficient estimates on REL are greater than those for the baseline 
panel regressions. Overall the evidence suggests that local religiosity has a negative effect on 
hedge fund risk-taking behaviors, even after we address endogeneity concerns through 
instrumental variables regressions.  
 
3.4.2. Dynamic panel GMM estimations 
To further address the endogeneity problem, we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and apply a 
dynamic panel GMM estimator in this section. Specifically, we estimate the following dynamic 
GMM model of Blundell and Bond (1998) using lagged risk measures as our instruments.15  
                                                 
14 As robustness checks, we use a variety of alternative model specifications and fixed effects and our results remain 
unchanged. 
15 Results are similar when we use dependent variables lagged by multiple years as our instruments. For details on 
the dynamic panel GMM estimation and the Stata program used, see the Appendix of Wintoki et al. (2012). For 
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           , , , , , ,    (3) 
where ,  is the total or idiosyncratic risk of hedge fund i in year t, ,  is the local 
religiosity ratio of fund i in year t, and X contains all control variables such as fund 
characteristics and demographic factors, as well as various fixed effects. The untabulated results 
show that the coefficients on REL are significantly negative for both total and idiosyncratic 
volatilities, and the economic magnitudes are indeed substantially enhanced relative to the other 
previously used methodologies. In sum, we document qualitatively similar results after 
controlling for endogeneity using dynamic panel GMM estimators.  
 
3.4.3. Hedge fund managers’ college- vs. fund-location religiosity 
In this section, we further address endogeneity concerns arising from reverse causality by 
exploring the effects of fund managers’ college- versus fund-location religiosity on their risk-
taking behaviors. Specifically, we conduct an extensive internet search for the biographies of 
hedge fund managers and hand collect the names of the undergraduate universities attended by 
fund managers for each of our sample hedge funds.16 We then add the county-level religiosity 
ratios of managers’ college locations (College REL) to our regressions and conduct a horse-race 
analysis. College-location religiosity may capture fund managers’ innate religious beliefs for at 
least two reasons (Shu et al. (2012)). First, it is likely that people with certain religious beliefs 
are drawn to a college which has a similar local culture and religion. Second, local religiosity at 
the college location may help nurture a person’s religious beliefs during the college years.  
                                                 
studies using dynamic panel GMM estimation, see also Roodman (2009), Warr, Elliott, Koëter-Kant, and Öztekin 
(2012), and Flannery and Hankins (2013), among others. 
16 Similar to Shu et al. (2012), analyses of college location religiosity significantly reduce our sample size due to (1) 
missing information on undergraduate colleges attended by fund managers from internet search; and (2) fund 
managers attending non-U.S. undergraduate universities. 
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We conjecture that if risk aversion induced by local religiosity leads to reduction in hedge 
fund risk-taking behaviors (the “local religiosity impact” hypothesis) then we expect to observe 
that local religiosity dominates managers’ college-location religiosity. Alternatively, if our 
findings are driven by reverse causality, that is, managers with certain religious beliefs or greater 
risk aversion are attracted to counties with higher religiosity ratios (the “self-selection” 
hypothesis) then we expect to see stronger effects of managers’ college-location religiosity on 
risk-taking as compared to fund-location religiosity. 
To further distinguish between the “local religiosity impact” and “self-selection” 
hypotheses, we also focus on a subsample of fund managers whose undergraduate universities 
are located far enough from hedge fund locations, i.e., in different U.S. Census Bureau regions.17 
Since it is unlikely that the religiosity ratios of a college location in different regions are 
significantly correlated with the characteristics associated with the fund’s location (Shu et al. 
(2012)), we expect the differential effects between college- and fund-location religiosity to be 
more pronounced for this subsample than for the full sample where the two religiosity ratios 
might be the same for some observations.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 reports multivariate regression results of total and idiosyncratic risk on managers’ 
college-location religiosity ratios as well as a horse-race analysis between college- and fund-
location religiosity. Panel A uses the full sample where we can manually identify fund managers’ 
undergraduate colleges in the U.S., and Panel B uses the subsample where managers’ colleges 
are located in different U.S. Census Bureau regions than fund locations. Note that, for both the 
full- and sub-sample tests, we exclude the most risky, directional strategy (Macro) and the least 
                                                 
17 The U.S. Census Bureau classifies the U.S. territory into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. See 
detailed classifications at http://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/maps-data/maps/reg_div.txt. 
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aggressive, non-directional strategy (Relative Value) to avoid the confounding effects from these 
two strategies as shown in Section 3.3. Namely, we only focus on hedge funds whose investment 
strategies belong to the semi-directional category: (1) Equity Hedge, (2) Event-Driven, and (3) 
Fund of Funds. In addition, we control for the demographic characteristics associated with both 
college and fund locations in all tests. 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that the coefficients on College REL are significantly negative, 
suggesting that to the extent that College REL captures managers’ innate religious beliefs, they 
do affect hedge fund risk-taking behaviors. After controlling for College REL, however, the 
coefficients on local religiosity (REL) remains significant and negative. Indeed, the coefficient 
magnitudes on REL are greater than those on College REL. Consistent with our main findings, 
Panel A suggests that even after controlling for reverse causality, local religiosity ratio has a 
significant negative impact on managers’ risk-taking behaviors.  
More importantly, Panel B of Table 7 shows that once we consider the subsample where 
the college location is in a different U.S. Census Bureau region than the fund’s location, the 
coefficient estimates on College REL become only marginal for total risk and insignificant for 
idiosyncratic risk. On the contrary, after controlling for College REL, the coefficients on REL 
remain significant and negative, and have the same magnitude as those from the full sample 
regressions in Panel A.  
Collectively, the horse-race analyses between college- and fund-location religiosity ratios 
lend further support to our hypothesis that local religious beliefs reduce hedge fund risk taking. 
While we do not rule out the possibility that more risk averse managers are drawn to counties 
with higher religiosity ratios, Table 7 provides support that our results are not simply driven by 
reverse causality. 
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3.5 Additional robustness tests 
In this section, we perform several additional robustness tests. First, we examine the 
effect of financial crises on our main findings. We also investigate whether our results are robust 
to the exclusion of hedge funds located in New York, which has the highest fund concentration. 
 
3.5.1 The effect of financial crises 
In this section, we examine the effect of local religiosity on hedge fund risk-taking during 
financial crisis versus non-crisis periods. Specifically, we refer to the years of 1998 (Asian 
financial crisis and LTCM), 2007, and 2008 (the most recent subprime mortgage crisis) as crisis 
period, and non-crisis period otherwise. Table 8 shows that while the coefficients on REL are 
significantly negative across both crisis and non-crisis periods, the effect appears to be larger for 
the crisis period.18 Overall the evidence suggests that the risk-reduction effect of REL is 
especially stronger and more valuable during crisis years, which are characterized by excessive 
risk-taking and uncertainty.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
3.5.2. Excluding hedge funds located in New York 
We now examine whether our findings are robust to the exclusion of states that have the 
highest hedge fund concentrations. While the locations of our sample hedge funds distribute 
across 46 states in the U.S., the top three states of hedge fund concentration are New York 
(38%), California (12.6%), and Illinois (9.5%). Altogether, these states constitute approximately 
                                                 
18 Again, we only focus on semi-directional strategies in the regressions to mitigate potential confounding effects. 
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60% of the full sample. In light of the dominance of New York in hedge fund locations, we 
conduct robustness tests by excluding funds located in New York.  
The untabulated tests suggest a robust negative relation between local religiosity and 
hedge fund total and idiosyncratic volatilities. To further ensure the robustness of our findings, 
we also exclude hedge funds located in the top two states and the top three states and find similar 
results. This evidence suggests that the negative relation between local religiosity and hedge fund 
risk-taking is not driven by states that have the highest hedge fund concentrations. 
 
3.6. Local religious beliefs and hedge fund performance 
Thus far, we have shown that risk aversion induced by local religiosity leads to lower 
hedge fund risk-taking. The natural question therefore arises as to whether local religious beliefs 
subsequently affect hedge fund performance. To address this question, we use the Nine-Factor 
Alpha estimated from annual regressions of monthly fund returns on the Carhart (1997) and 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) combined nine factors as shown in Equation (1). 
In untabulated tests, we estimate panel and Fama-MacBeth regressions of hedge fund 
performance as proxied by Nine-Factor Alphas on local religiosity. To control for potential 
endogeneity, we also run IV regressions and dynamic panel GMM estimation. Across all models, 
REL is insignificantly related to Alpha, suggesting that local religiosity does not affect hedge 
fund performance. 
The overall evidence indicates that while local religiosity reduces hedge fund risk-taking, 
it does not (negatively) impact fund performance. Therefore, the higher return volatilities of 
hedge funds located in counties with lower religiosity ratios are not rewarded by higher returns. 
This finding has important implications for investors, fund managers, and policy makers alike. 
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3.7. Across religious groups: Catholic vs. Protestant 
It is worth noting that Shu et al. (2012) focus on the effect of different religious beliefs, 
i.e., Catholicism vs. Protestantism, on mutual fund risk-taking. In this paper, we instead focus on 
the effect of the level of local religiosity on hedge fund risk-taking because prior literature has 
established a robust association between religious beliefs and individuals’ risk aversion. 
However, the literature is inconclusive regarding the differences across religious groups.   
On the one hand, several studies suggest that Catholics may exhibit less aversion to 
speculative risk than average population, whereas Protestants exhibit more aversion to 
speculative risk (Halek and Eisenhauer (2001)). This distinction may reflect differences in 
religious teachings regarding gambling in general: while Protestant philosophy strongly 
condemns any kind of gambling activity and considers it sinful, Catholic philosophy is somewhat 
tolerant of gambling and Catholic churches even use bingo and lottery for their own fundraising 
(Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) and Adhikari and Agrawal (2016a)). Indeed, Kumar (2009) and 
Kumar et al. (2011) show that both individual and institutional investors in predominantly 
Catholic (Protestant) locations invest more (less) in lottery-type stocks. Shu et al. (2012) show 
that mutual finds located in counties with high Catholics to Protestants ratio (CP-Ratio) tend to 
undertake higher risk. Adhikari and Agrawal (2016a) show that firms headquartered in counties 
with higher  CP-Ratio tend to be more innovative. 
On the other hand, Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that Protestants tend to be more 
risk-tolerant than Catholics. Similarly, Baxamusa and Jalal (2015) find that CEOs who self-
identify as Catholics are inclined to undertake less risk.  
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In contrast to both of the above views, Hilary and Hui (2009) show that non-financial 
firms headquartered in counties with high Catholic or Protestant ratios take less risk. Likewise, 
Adhikari and Agrawal (2016b) document that a large Catholic or Protestant population in an area 
negatively predicts bank risk-taking, although the latter result is weaker.  
Given this ambiguity in literature, we focus on the level of local religiosity in this paper. 
Nevertheless, for completeness we also consider the CP-Ratio as well as the separate Catholic 
and Protestant ratios as measures of local religious beliefs, and find mixed results. Specifically, 
both the CP-Ratio and Catholic ratio are negatively related to hedge fund risk, while the 
Protestant ratio is either positively or insignificantly related to fund risk. And the results are 
primarily driven by semi-directional strategies.  
 
4. Local Preference Channel: Risk Preferences of Local Managers and Investors  
So far we have documented that hedge funds located in more religious counties tend to 
take less risk. In this section, we investigate the underlying channel through which local 
religiosity could negatively affect hedge fund risk-taking behaviors, namely, the effect of local 
religiosity on the risk aversion of local hedge fund managers and investors.  
Arguably, the risk preferences of local managers and investors could play an important 
role in determining the impact of local religiosity on hedge fund risk-taking. For instance, hedge 
fund managers are often local or conform to local cultural and religious forms, and they care 
greatly about hedge fund idiosyncratic risk because they are often under-diversified and their 
human capital, compensation, and total wealth are disproportionately tied to the fund that they 
manage. In addition, the literature on local bias suggests that hedge funds tend to hold more local 
stocks in their portfolios (Teo (2009)), which makes fund idiosyncratic risk important for them. 
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Moreover, hedge fund managers are hired to act in the best interest of their investors and can 
benefit from catering to local investors’ risk preferences (Sialm et al. (2014)). In sum, higher 
local religiosity could induce higher risk aversion of local managers and investors, thus leading 
to lower hedge fund risk-taking. This argument implies that if the risk preferences of local 
managers and investors present one mechanism by which local religiosity affects hedge fund 
risk-taking, we expect to find a more pronounced effect of local religiosity on risk-taking in 
subsamples of hedge funds for which local managers and investors are economically more 
important.  
To test the local preference channel, we consider three indicators of the importance of 
local managers and investors: hedge fund strategy, age, and size. In particular, Sialm et al. (2014) 
suggest that semi-directional strategies such as equity hedge and event studies are  most likely to 
be affected whereas directional strategies such as macro are least likely to be impacted by local 
investor preferences.  In addition, younger and smaller funds are more dependent upon and thus 
affected by local managers and investors compared to older and larger funds. For instance, local 
investors’ preferences are perhaps less important to old and large hedge funds, which are highly 
visible and have large and disperse investor bases. Moreover, as Yonker (2016) implies, young 
and small hedge funds are more likely to have local residents in the top management team. 
Therefore, we expect to see stronger effects of local religiosity on risk-taking in semi-directional 
rather than directional strategies, young rather than old, and small rather than large funds.  
As mentioned earlier, the results in Table 5 are indeed consistent with our conjecture 
regarding hedge funds strategies. We find that local religiosity is significantly negatively related 
to risk-taking for semi-directional strategies, but positively related to risk-taking for directional 
strategies, indicating that the negative effect of local religiosity on hedge fund risk-taking may be 
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at least partially driven by local preferences.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Panel A of Table 9 compares young versus old hedge funds, where young funds are 
defined as those aged below the sample median (i.e., 5 years for our sample) and old funds those 
above. We show that the negative relation between local religiosity and hedge fund risk-taking is 
only significant for young funds but nonexistent for old funds. This result is consistent with local 
preference hypothesis, to the extent that young and new funds rather than old and established 
ones depend more on local managers and investors and in turn are more affected by local 
residents’ risk preferences.  
Panel B of Table 9 compares small and large funds, where small ones are those with 
AUMs below the sample median and large ones otherwise. Again, consistent with the local 
preference channel, we find that the negative effect of local religiosity on hedge fund risk-taking 
is only significant for small funds but insignificant for large funds.  
Overall, the subsample regression results show that the inverse relation between local 
religiosity and hedge fund risk-taking is primarily driven by funds more likely to cater to local 
risk preferences, namely young and small funds. These analyses, combined with the earlier 
findings on hedge fund strategies suggest that risk preferences of local managers and investors 
constitute one channel through which local religiosity mitigates hedge fund risk-taking. 
 
5. Local Religiosity and Hedge Fund Holdings  
In this section we examine hedge fund stock holdings to investigate whether hedge funds 
located in more religious counties tend to take lower risk by investing in less risky stocks and 
diversify risk at the portfolio level. 
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We obtain holdings from Thomson Reuters institutional holdings (13F) database, which 
reports quarterly U.S. equity positions of all institutions (including hedge fund firms) with more 
than $100 million of AUM. We match each hedge fund in our main sample with the 13F 
database by name and identify 1,637 hedge fund firms. Since 13F dataset does not cover the 
short positions or derivatives, we only focus on the long equity positions of hedge fund firms. 
We then estimate various holdings-based risk measures for each hedge fund firm following Shu 
et al. (2012).  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
First, we investigate whether hedge funds located in counties with higher religiosity 
ratios tend to reduce risk-taking by holding individual stocks with lower return volatilities. To 
answer this question, each year we estimate total and idiosyncratic risk for each stock with at 
least 18 months of return observations on a 24-month rolling window basis as the standard 
deviation of monthly returns and the residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, 
respectively. We then calculate value-weighted averages of total and idiosyncratic risk of 
individual stocks held by each hedge fund. Panel A of Table 10 shows that local religiosity is 
significantly negatively related to average total and idiosyncratic return volatilities of stocks held 
by hedge funds. Our results suggest that higher local religiosity ratios reduce hedge fund 
managers’ risk-taking at the individual stock level, i.e., through holding less risky stocks.  
We next examine whether the differences in hedge fund risk-taking behaviors across 
counties with varying local religiosity ratios are also attributed to portfolio diversification. To 
explore this channel, we examine total and idiosyncratic return volatilities of hypothetical 
holdings-based hedge fund portfolios. Specifically, we first calculate holdings-based portfolio 
returns as the monthly buy-and-hold returns of hedge funds’ reported equity holdings on a value-
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weighted basis. We then estimate portfolio total and idiosyncratic risk, respectively, as the 
standard deviation of hypothetical fund portfolio monthly returns and the residuals from the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model on a 24-month rolling window basis every year. Panel B of 
Table 10 shows that local religiosity is significantly and negatively related to portfolio total and 
idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that local religiosity not only reduces hedge fund managers’ 
incentives to hold riskier individual stocks but also increases fund portfolio diversification.  
Finally, to shed further light on portfolio diversification, we directly investigate two 
metrics of industry concentration of hedge fund portfolios: (1) Industry Herfindahl Index, 
defined as the sum of squared industry weights of a  hedge fund portfolio; and (2) KSZ Index, 
i.e., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) industry concentration index, defined as the sum of 
squared differences between a fund portfolio’s industry weights and the corresponding market’s 
industry weights. Panel C of Table 10 documents that local religiosity is significantly negatively 
related to both concentration measures, suggesting that hedge funds located in lower religiosity 
ratio areas tend to deviate from well-diversified portfolios and concentrate in fewer industries. 
Overall, the results suggest that hedge funds located in counties with higher religiosity 
ratios tend to not only hold individual stocks with lower return volatilities, but also diversify 
their portfolios across industries, thus contributing to lower hedge fund risk-taking. 
In contrast to our findings, Shu et al. (2012) document that local religiosity only appears 
to affect mutual fund risk-taking at the portfolio level, but not at the individual stock level. One 
potential explanation for this difference is that whereas mutual funds experience closer scrutiny 
and thus are less willing to take risk on individual stocks that may be observable to competitors 
and clients, hedge funds are lightly regulated and subject to less scrutiny, and hence tend to 
undertake risk at the individual stock level as well as the portfolio level. Further, while Shu et al. 
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(2012) suggest that their results cannot be attributed to mutual fund managers’ local stock 
preference, it is possible that our results are driven by hedge fund managers located in more 
religious counties investing disproportionally in less risky local stocks (Teo (2009)).  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the effect of local religious beliefs on organizational risk-
taking using hedge funds as a new and unique setting. While prior literature suggests that local 
religiosity induced risk aversion may mitigate hedge fund risk-taking, the unique features of 
hedge funds (e.g., stiff competition and heightened financial incentives) may make it least likely 
for religion to affect hedge fund risk-taking behaviors. Thus, if we document significant 
evidence in the hedge fund industry, it would provide strong support for the impact of local 
religiosity on organizational risk-taking.  
Using a sample of 7,033 hedge funds from the HFR database and county-level religiosity 
data during 1996-2013, we document robust evidence that local religiosity is significantly 
negatively related to total and idiosyncratic risk of hedge funds. This relation still holds even 
after controlling for endogeneity using IV regressions, dynamic panel GMM estimations, and a 
horse-race analysis between managers’ college- and fund-location religiosity, indicating that 
local religious beliefs instill a risk-aversion culture to the hedge fund industry. Further, we find 
that the risk mitigating effect of local religiosity exists for both crisis and non-crisis periods but 
appears to be stronger during crisis period, when it is most important and needed, i.e., during 
time periods with excessive risk-taking and uncertainty. The result is also robust to excluding 
hedge funds in the state with the highest hedge fund concentration. However, we do not find 
local religiosity affects hedge fund performance.  
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We next investigate the underlying channel through which local religiosity mitigates 
hedge fund risk-taking. The evidence shows that the effect of local religiosity on the risk 
preferences of local managers and investors may, at least partially, help explain our finding. 
Specifically, we find that the negative relation between local religiosity and hedge fund risk-
taking is only pronounced among funds for which local managers and investors are economically 
more important, i.e., semi-directional (such as equity hedge) rather than directional (such as 
macro), young rather than old, and small rather than large funds.  
Finally, analyses of hedge fund equity holdings show that funds located in counties with 
higher religiosity ratios tend to hold less risky stocks and diversify their stock portfolios across 
industries, thus contributing to lower hedge fund return volatilities. 
Taken together, our evidence shows that local religious beliefs, an important component 
of local culture, may motivate hedge fund managers to reduce risk-taking. These findings could 
further our understanding of the effect of local religiosity on organizational risk-taking behaviors 
in the financial industry in general and the hedge fund sector in particular. Our study also 
provides important insights into hedge fund managers’ risk-taking incentives. Further, our results 
have important implications for investors and policymakers alike, especially those who are 
concerned about the risk-taking behaviors of hedge funds and their impact on the whole 
economy. In particular, a potential policy implication is that any regulatory tools aimed at 
preventing hedge funds from taking excessive risks should also take into account differences in 
inherent culture-driven risk-taking preferences of hedge funds’ key stakeholders. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
Hedge fund risk-taking measures: 
Total Risk Standard deviation of monthly returns of each hedge fund on a 24-
month rolling window. 
Idiosyncratic Risk Standard deviation of the residuals from the nine-factor model, in which 
we combine the Carhart (1997) four factors and Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
seven factors. 
Average Total Risk 
 
Value-weighted average total risk of stocks held by each hedge fund. 
Each year, we estimate total risk as the standard deviation of monthly 
returns on a 24-month rolling window basis for each stock with at least 
18 months of return observations.   
Average Idiosyncratic Risk Value-weighted average idiosyncratic risk of stocks held by each hedge 
fund. Each year, we estimate idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation 
of the residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model on a 24-
month rolling window basis for each stock with at least 18 months of 
return observations.   
Nine-Factor Alpha The intercept from the annual regressions of monthly hedge fund 
returns on the combined Carhart (1997) and Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
nine factors. 
Holdings-based Portfolio Total 
Risk 
We first calculate holdings-based portfolio returns as the monthly buy-
and-hold returns of hedge funds’ reported equity holdings, and then 
estimate total risk as the standard deviation of holdings-based returns of 
a hedge fund firm on a 24-month rolling window basis. 
Holdings-based Portfolio 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
We first calculate holdings-based portfolio returns as the monthly buy-
and-hold returns of hedge funds’ reported equity holdings, and then 
estimate idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residuals of 
holdings-based returns of a hedge fund firm from the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model on a 24-month rolling window basis. 
Industry Herfindahl Index The sum of squared industry (four-digit SIC code) weights of a hedge 
fund firm. 
KSZ Index Kacperczyk et al. (2005) industry concentration index, defined as the 
sum of squared differences between a hedge fund firm’s industry (four-
digit SIC code) weights and the corresponding market’s industry 
weights.   
  
Local religiosity measures: 
REL The religiosity ratio of the county where a fund is located, calculated as 
the total number of adherents of all congregations divided by the total 
population in the county. 
College REL The religiosity ratio of the county where a fund manager’s 
undergraduate college is located, defined as the total number of 
adherents of all congregations divided by total population in the county. 
  
Hedge fund characteristics: 
leverage Specifies whether a hedge fund intends to use leverage. 
high_watermark Specifies whether fees are taken only after a high watermark. 
fund_assets Total assets under management by the hedge fund. We take the natural 
logarithm in regressions (log_fund_assets). 
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firm_assets Total assets under management by the hedge fund firm. We take the 
natural logarithm in regressions (log_firm_assets). 
lockup Lockup interval (the number of months that new investor cannot 
redeem assets). 
advance_notice Indicates advance notice (in days) required for redemptions. 
management_fee Annual management fee (in percentage). 
minimum_investment Minimum investment for the hedge fund. We take the natural logarithm 
in regressions (log_minimum_investment). 
incentive_fee Annual incentive fee (in percentage). 
hurdle_rate Specifies whether a hurdle rate exists. 
audit Indicates whether an annual audit is performed. 
 
Local demographic characteristics:  
age The median age of the county population. 
edu The fraction of advanced education attained. Educational attainment is 
defined by the percentage of people 25 years and above who have a 
Bachelor’s, postgraduate, or professional degree. 
income The mean per capita personal income of a county.  
ttlpop Total county population. We take the natural logarithm in regressions 
(log_ttlpop). 
mf The ratio of male to female population in the county. 
minority The fraction of the minority population in the total county population. 
married The fraction of married households in the total number of households. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics of key variables for our full sample during 1996-2013. All of the variables are defined in 
Appendix A and winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels.  
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 Min Max 
Panel A. Hedge Fund Risk Measures 
Total Risk 31,821 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.16 
Idiosyncratic Risk 31,821 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 
Panel B. Hedge Fund Characteristics 
leverage 32,391 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
high_watermark 32,391 0.87 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
fund_assets ($mn) 29,617 157.52 367.00 10.55 37.07 120.60 0.25 2515.51 
firm_assets ($mn) 31,675 9,960 40,500 65.70 353 2,250 0.49 326,000 
lockup 31,058 4.65 6.88 0.00 0.00 12.00 0.00 84.00 
advance_notice 31,190 43.34 28.42 30.00 30.00 60.00 0.00 365.00 
management_fee 32,174 1.44 0.60 1.00 1.50 2.00 0.00 20.00 
minimum_investment ($mn) 32,097 1.30 3.52 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.00 100.00 
incentive_fee 32,056 16.89 6.91 15.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 65.00 
hurdle_rate 32,391 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
audit 32,391 0.92 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Panel C. Local Religiosity 
REL 32,090 0.54 0.11 0.44 0.55 0.62 0.26 0.74 
Panel D. Demographic Characteristics 
age 32,263 36.44 2.96 34.96 36.19 37.50 31.30 50.97 
edu 32,263 42.63 11.35 32.44 43.66 53.75 16.79 58.10 
income 32,074 58,953.00 15,212.69 46,503.50 63,188.00 70,883.00 25,239.00 86,010.50 
ttlpop (000) 32,263 1,870.00 2,010.00 805.00 1,540.00 1,590.00 0.09 9,820.00 
mf 32,263 0.92 0.05 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.86 1.07 
minority 31,978 0.38 0.11 0.27 0.43 0.44 0.09 0.61 
married 31,978 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.23 
 
39 
 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients among the key variables for our full sample during 1996-2013. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the 
upper and lower 1% levels. * indicates significance levels at 5% or better. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Total Risk 1.00                    
(2) Idio. Risk 0.73* 1.00                   
(3) REL -0.02* -0.04* 1.00                  
(4) log_fund_assets -0.23* -0.14* 0.01 1.00                 
(5) log_firm_assets -0.21* -0.17* 0.04* 0.53* 1.00                
(6) advance_notice -0.15* -0.14* -0.03* 0.19* 0.09* 1.00               
(7) log_min_invest -0.15* -0.12* 0.01* 0.28* 0.22* 0.14* 1.00              
(8) management_fee 0.09* 0.12* 0.00 0.00* -0.05* -0.12* -0.01 1.00             
(9) incentive_fee 0.16* 0.18* -0.02 -0.09* -0.15* -0.22* 0.06* 0.17* 1.00            
(10) high_watermark 0.08* 0.09* -0.04* -0.02 -0.06* -0.03* 0.07* 0.04* 0.47* 1.00           
(11) lockup 0.06* 0.03* -0.08* 0.00 -0.06* 0.31* 0.09* -0.11* 0.02* 0.08* 1.00          
(12) hurdle_rate -0.07* -0.06* 0.04* 0.03* 0.09* 0.06* 0.05* -0.19* -0.05* -0.02 0.03* 1.00         
(13) leverage 0.13* 0.13* 0.01* -0.04* -0.08* -0.14* -0.03* 0.10* 0.29* 0.13* -0.02* -0.08* 1.00        
(14) audit -0.03* -0.01* 0.01* 0.09* 0.09* 0.10* 0.03* -0.02* -0.01 0.06* 0.07* 0.01* -0.03* 1.00       
(15) age 0.04* 0.06* -0.09* 0.00 -0.10* 0.01 -0.04* 0.03* -0.01* -0.02* -0.01* -0.04* 0.00 -0.02* 1.00      
(16) edu -0.04* -0.01 -0.14* 0.18* 0.15* 0.12* 0.08* 0.01 0.01 0.05* 0.05* -0.03* 0.05* 0.03* 0.15* 1.00     
(17) income -0.03* 0.01* 0.17* 0.13* 0.09* 0.10* 0.04* 0.04* 0.00* 0.02* 0.02* -0.03* 0.05* 0.01* 0.37* 0.75* 1.00    
(18) log_ttlpop -0.08* -0.07* 0.10* 0.05* 0.09* 0.03* 0.08* 0.06* 0.01* 0.03* -0.02 0.03 -0.09* 0.06* -0.34 -0.08* -0.09* 1.00   
(19) mf 0.08* 0.06* -0.22* -0.18* -0.19* -0.08* -0.09* -0.07* 0.04* -0.01* 0.05* -0.02 0.00 -0.03* -0.10 -0.49* -0.33* -0.17* 1.00  
(20) minor -0.07* -0.07* -0.03* 0.10* 0.18* 0.05 0.09* 0.01* 0.00* 0.04* 0.03* 0.02* -0.06* 0.06* -0.51* 0.22* 0.06* 0.48* -0.24* 1.00 
(21) marr 0.08* 0.07* 0.09* -0.17* -0.26* -0.09* -0.10* 0.01* 0.01* -0.05* -0.06* -0.01 0.02* -0.06* 0.44* -0.50* -0.21* -0.30* 0.50* -0.78* 
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Table 3. Excess Hedge Fund Risk-taking Sorted by Local Religiosity 
 
This table reports average excess fund total and idiosyncratic risk sorted by local religiosity. Each year during 1996–2013, we sort 
hedge funds into quintiles based on local religiosity. We then calculate the means of excess fund total and idiosyncratic risk for 
each quintile, and report the time-series means of both excess risk measures. We also report the differences between the top and 
bottom religiosity quintiles and the associated t-statistics. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the 
upper and lower 1% levels. We obtain excess risk measures of a fund by subtracting the annual median values within the fund’s 
investment strategy. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 Low 2 3 4 High High-Low t-stat 
Mean Excess Total Risk 0.0021 -0.0024 0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0027*** -2.7678 
Mean Excess Idiosyncratic Risk 0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0010** -1.9200 
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Table 4. Regression Analyses of Hedge Fund Risk-taking on Local Religiosity 
 
This table presents regression analyses of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity during 1996-2013. Panel A provides fixed-
effects panel regression results using strategy and year fixed effects. Panel B provides Fama-MacBeth regression results, where 
each year we run cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund risk measures on local religiosity, and then calculate the time-series 
averages of regression coefficients. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels. 
P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Strategy and Year Fixed Effects Panel Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
REL -0.013*** -0.003** -0.008*** -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.002) (0.188) 
log_fund_assets   -0.143
*** -0.017*** 
   (0.000) (0.008) 
log_firm_assets   -0.064
*** -0.035*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
log_advance_notice   -0.000 -0.000
* 
   (0.876) (0.051) 
log_minimum_investment   -0.002
*** -0.001*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
management_fee   0.003
*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
incentive_fee   -0.000 0.000
*** 
   (0.288) (0.000) 
high_watermark   0.002
*** 0.001*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
log_lockup   0.001
*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
hurdle_rate -0.000 0.000 
(0.765) (0.227) 
leverage   0.004
*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
audit   0.001
** 0.002*** 
   (0.046) (0.000) 
age 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.072) (0.000) (0.041) (0.001) 
edu -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.196) (0.108) (0.623) 
log_income 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.120) (0.504) (0.742) 
log_ttlpop -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.024) 
mf -0.005 0.005 -0.006 0.006* 
 (0.362) (0.100) (0.277) (0.062) 
minor -0.002 -0.003** -0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.432) (0.031) (0.683) (0.007) 
marr 0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.016** 
 (0.462) (0.381) (0.806) (0.020) 
Constant 0.021* -0.012** 0.073*** 0.005 
 (0.055) (0.036) (0.000) (0.439) 
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,190 31,190 26,315 26,315 
R-squared 0.204 0.152 0.242 0.172 
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Panel B. Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
REL -0.014*** -0.006** -0.015*** -0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.007) (0.024) 
log_fund_assets   -0.225*** -0.037*** 
   (0.000) (0.004) 
log_firm_assets   -0.079*** -0.036*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
log_advance_notice   -0.003*** -0.001*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
log_minimum_investment   -0.002*** -0.001*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
management_fee   0.003*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
incentive_fee   0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
high_watermark   0.002*** 0.001*** 
   (0.006) (0.001) 
log_lockup   0.002*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.003) 
hurdle_rate   -0.003*** -0.001** 
   (0.001) (0.029) 
leverage   0.005*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
audit   0.001 0.002** 
   (0.307) (0.018) 
age 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.051) (0.046) (0.051) (0.057) 
edu 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.017) (0.044) (0.013) (0.060) 
log_income -0.011*** -0.004* -0.007** -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.063) (0.027) (0.122) 
log_ttlpop -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.019) (0.600) 
mf 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.004 
 (0.186) (0.142) (0.833) (0.394) 
minor 0.006 -0.002 0.003 -0.006** 
 (0.155) (0.310) (0.257) (0.027) 
marr 0.061** 0.022 0.018 -0.014 
 (0.015) (0.105) (0.373) (0.383) 
Constant 0.130*** 0.047*** 0.147*** 0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 31,190 31,190 26,315 26,315 
R-squared 0.024 0.018 0.144 0.105 
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Table 5. Regression Analyses of Local Religiosity and Hedge Fund Risk-taking by Fund Strategy 
 
This table reports fixed-effects panel regressions and Fama-MacBeth regression results of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity 
during 1996-2013 by fund strategy. Strategy (1) is Equity Hedge, Strategy (2) is Event-Driven, Strategy (3) is Fund of Funds, 
Strategy (4) is Macro, and Strategy (5) is Relative Value. Strategies (1) through (3) are semi-directional, (4) is directional, and (5) 
is non-directional investment strategies. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the upper and lower 1% 
levels. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. All control variables are included in regressions; for 
brevity, only the coefficients on REL are presented. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed 
test, respectively. 
 
  Fixed Effects  Fama-MacBeth 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk   Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
Strategy (1): REL -0.029*** -0.012***  -0.038
*** -0.019*** 
Equity Hedge  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  No No 
 Observations 10,344 10,344  10,344 10,344 
 R-squared 0.222 0.142  0.132 0.097 
Strategy (2): REL -0.023* -0.006  -0.043
*** -0.006 
Event-Driven  (0.085) (0.412)  (0.004) (0.370) 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  No No 
 Observations 2,974 2,974  2,974 2,974 
 R-squared 0.160 0.110  0.240 0.196 
Strategy (3): REL 0.004 0.002  0.008 0.004 
Fund of Funds  (0.199) (0.300)  (0.343) (0.437) 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  No No 
 Observations 4,816 4,816  4,816 4,816 
R-squared 0.313 0.238 0.228 0.235 
Strategy (4): REL 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.039*** 0.016*** 
Macro  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.009) (0.005) 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  No No 
 Observations 4,056 4,056  4,056 4,056 
 R-squared 0.128 0.117  0.227 0.201 
Strategy (5): REL 0.008 0.004  0.030
** 0.008** 
Relative Value  (0.118) (0.241)  (0.022) (0.033) 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  No No 
 Observations 4,125 4,125  4,125 4,125 
 R-squared 0.262 0.179  0.202 0.178 
Strategies  REL -0.020*** -0.008***  -0.031
*** -0.013*** 
(1),(2), & (3)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
 (Strategy × Year) FE Yes Yes  No No 
 Observations 18,134 18,134  18,134 18,134 
 R-squared 0.293 0.192  0.153 0.113 
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Table 6. Instrumental Variables (IV) Regressions of Hedge Fund Risk-taking on Local Religiosity 
 
This table shows instrumental variable (IV) regression results of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity during 1996-2013. The 
first stage regresses local religiosity (REL) on the two instrumental variables, lagged 3-year religiosity (REL_lag3) and lagged 3-
year total population of the county (ttlpop_lag3) in millions. The second stage regresses hedge fund risk-taking on the fitted value 
of REL from the first stage. The two stages are jointly estimated. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at 
the upper and lower 1% levels. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. Constants are omitted. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 First Stage  Second Stage 
   (1) (2) 
 REL  Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
REL   -0.013
*** -0.005*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) 
REL_lag3 0.4690***    
 (0.0016)    
ttlpop_lag3 0.1685***    
 (0.0209)    
log_fund_assets -0.0847***  -0.143
*** -0.016*** 
 (0.0097)  (0.011) (0.006) 
log_firm_assets 0.0637***  -0.063
*** -0.035*** 
 (0.0061)  (0.007) (0.004) 
log_advance_notice 0.0004**  -0.000 -0.000
** 
 (0.0002)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_minimum_investment 0.0002  -0.002
*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
management_fee -0.0001  0.003
*** 0.002*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.000) (0.000) 
incentive_fee 0.0000  -0.000 0.000
*** 
(0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
high_watermark 0.0020*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.000) 
log_lockup -0.0002  0.001
*** 0.000*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
hurdle_rate -0.0012***  -0.000 0.000 
 (0.0004)  (0.000) (0.000) 
leverage -0.0032***  0.004
*** 0.002*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.000) (0.000) 
audit 0.0027***  0.001
** 0.002*** 
 (0.0006)  (0.001) (0.000) 
age -0.0037***  0.000 0.000
** 
 (0.0001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
edu -0.0022***  -0.000
** -0.000 
 (0.0000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_income 0.0587***  0.003
* 0.001 
 (0.0014)  (0.002) (0.001) 
log_ttlpop -0.1771***  -0.001
*** -0.000** 
 (0.0210)  (0.000) (0.000) 
mf 0.0709***  -0.014
** 0.001 
 (0.0056)  (0.006) (0.003) 
minor 0.0032  -0.001 -0.004
*** 
 (0.0033)  (0.003) (0.002) 
marr 0.3355***  0.003 -0.013
* 
 (0.0125)  (0.012) (0.007) 
Strategy and Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 26,276  26,276 26,276 
R-squared 0.958  0.150 0.103 
Endogeneity test p-value   0.0000 0.0000 
 stage p-value for F-statistic 0.0000    
Second stage p-value for Hansen J-statistic   0.7114 0.4935 
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Table 7. Local Religiosity versus Fund Managers’ College-Location Religiosity 
 
This table reports regression results of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity (REL) versus fund managers’ undergraduate college location religiosity (College REL) during 
1996-2013. Panel A uses the full sample (including strategies 1 (Equity Hedge), 2 (Event-Driven), and 3 (Fund of Funds)) where we can manually identify fund managers’ 
undergraduate colleges in the U.S., while Panel B uses the subsample where the undergraduate colleges attended by fund managers are in different U.S. Census Bureau regions 
than fund locations. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels. Demographic variables associated with fund managers’ 
college locations are also controlled in all tests. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. Constants are omitted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 Panel A. Full Sample  Panel B. Subsample of Different Regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk  Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
REL   -0.021*** -0.007**    -0.021*** -0.007** 
   (0.000) (0.013)    (0.000) (0.038) 
College REL -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.008** -0.005***  -0.008* -0.003 -0.008* -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003)  (0.052) (0.188) (0.066) (0.158) 
log_fund_assets -0.045* 0.021 -0.045* 0.023*  -0.050* 0.020 -0.048* 0.023 
 (0.074) (0.130) (0.078) (0.093)  (0.082) (0.201) (0.097) (0.140) 
log_firm_assets -0.071*** -0.038*** -0.068*** -0.037***  -0.072*** -0.037*** -0.066*** -0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log_advance_notice 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* 
 (0.116) (0.135) (0.221) (0.232)  (0.103) (0.136) (0.047) (0.074) 
log_minimum_investment -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001***  -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
management_fee 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
incentive_fee -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000  -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.017) (0.222) (0.010) (0.387)  (0.000) (0.871) (0.000) (0.490) 
high_watermark 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.461) (0.322) (0.523) (0.268)  (0.781) (0.189) (0.815) (0.119) 
log_lockup 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001***  0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hurdle_rate -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000  -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.329) (0.399) (0.442) (0.604)  (0.774) (0.260) (0.982) (0.476) 
leverage 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002***  0.006*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
audit 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***  0.008*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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College age 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000**  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
College edu -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.029) (0.080) (0.010) (0.058)  (0.280) (0.785) (0.143) (0.870) 
College log_income -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.741) (0.704) (0.968) (0.594)  (0.270) (0.132) (0.410) (0.181) 
College log_ttlpop 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000  -0.001** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000** 
 (0.984) (0.855) (0.969) (0.910)  (0.015) (0.074) (0.007) (0.045) 
College mf -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004  -0.005 -0.001 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.244) (0.378) (0.263) (0.400)  (0.605) (0.783) (0.394) (0.591) 
College minor 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.003  -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.606) (0.452) (0.691) (0.375)  (0.637) (0.988) (0.669) (0.998) 
College marr 0.017 0.006 0.016 0.004  0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004 
 (0.155) (0.395) (0.207) (0.504)  (0.967) (0.626) (0.978) (0.666) 
age -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000  -0.001** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000* 
 (0.027) (0.412) (0.001) (0.118)  (0.021) (0.248) (0.001) (0.088) 
edu 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.879) (0.227)  (0.429) (0.090) (0.253) (0.689) 
log_income 0.000 -0.000 0.007** 0.002  0.002 0.000 0.009*** 0.003 
 (0.852) (0.955) (0.015) (0.144)  (0.456) (0.792) (0.006) (0.144) 
log_ttlpop -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 
 (0.659) (0.701) (0.190) (0.597)  (0.397) (0.467) (0.007) (0.052) 
mf 0.009 0.011** -0.017 0.002  0.032*** 0.022*** 0.007 0.015* 
 (0.323) (0.017) (0.116) (0.695)  (0.006) (0.000) (0.623) (0.052) 
minor 0.014** 0.003 0.012** 0.002  0.006 0.001 0.003 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.352) (0.041) (0.488)  (0.389) (0.771) (0.667) (0.991) 
marr 0.071*** 0.023* 0.084*** 0.027*  0.040 0.007 0.057* 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.094) (0.001) (0.055)  (0.171) (0.652) (0.057) (0.479) 
Constant 0.049* -0.011 0.018 -0.020  0.032 -0.021 -0.004 -0.032* 
 (0.058) (0.446) (0.492) (0.152)  (0.309) (0.209) (0.894) (0.061) 
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,817 5,817 5,789 5,789  4,215 4,215 4,187 4,187 
R-squared 0.273 0.190 0.275 0.191  0.274 0.193 0.276 0.194 
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Table 8. Analysis of Financial Crises 
 
This table reports fixed effects panel regressions of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity (REL), on subsamples partitioned 
on financial crisis period. Crisis refers to years of 1998, 2007, and 2008; and Non-Crisis otherwise. The sample includes strategies 
1 (Equity Hedge), 2 (Event-Driven), and 3 (Fund of Funds). All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the 
upper and lower 1% levels. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. Constants are omitted. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 Crisis  Non-Crisis 
 Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk  Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
REL -0.025*** -0.010**  -0.019
*** -0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.020)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_fund_assets -0.100*** -0.004  -0.125
*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.846)  (0.000) (0.004) 
log_firm_assets -0.066*** -0.033***  -0.077
*** -0.038*** 
 (0.002) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_advance_notice 0.002* 0.001*  0.001
*** 0.001*** 
 (0.075) (0.066)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_minimum_investment -0.003*** -0.001***  -0.001
*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
management_fee 0.003** 0.002***  0.002
*** 0.001*** 
 (0.015) (0.009)  (0.000) (0.002) 
incentive_fee -0.000* 0.000*  -0.000
*** 0.000** 
 (0.065) (0.097)  (0.000) (0.043) 
high_watermark 0.003** 0.001  0.002
*** 0.001*** 
(0.050) (0.156) (0.000) (0.003) 
log_lockup 0.002*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.067)  (0.000) (0.000) 
hurdle_rate 0.002* 0.001  -0.000 0.000 
 (0.095) (0.123)  (0.981) (0.633) 
leverage 0.005*** 0.003***  0.003
*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
audit -0.002 0.003**  0.000 0.001
* 
 (0.427) (0.032)  (0.895) (0.091) 
age -0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000 
 (0.848) (0.342)  (0.560) (0.990) 
edu -0.000 0.000  -0.000
** -0.000 
 (0.101) (0.399)  (0.021) (0.171) 
log_income 0.004 -0.003  0.004
** 0.002* 
 (0.370) (0.259)  (0.034) (0.076) 
log_ttlpop -0.001 0.000  -0.001
*** -0.000 
 (0.412) (0.411)  (0.002) (0.692) 
mf -0.038** 0.013  -0.020
*** -0.002 
 (0.044) (0.196)  (0.005) (0.646) 
minor -0.001 -0.009*  -0.002 -0.006
*** 
 (0.930) (0.064)  (0.514) (0.001) 
marr 0.008 -0.022  -0.008 -0.023
*** 
 (0.842) (0.329)  (0.621) (0.006) 
Strategy and Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 3,433 3,433  14,701 14,701 
R-squared 0.184 0.137  0.268 0.170 
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Table 9. Tests of Local Preference Channel: Subsample Analyses 
 
This table presents tests of local preference channel by estimating regressions of hedge fund risk-taking on local religiosity (REL), 
on subsamples partitioned on fund age (Young vs. Old) and fund size (Small vs. Large). All control variables are included in the 
regressions but not reported for brevity. Subsample Young (Old) contains hedge funds with an age smaller than (greater than or 
equal to) the sample median for each year. Subsample Small (Large) contains hedge funds with fund assets smaller than (greater 
than or equal to) the sample median for each year. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the upper and 
lower 1% levels. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. Constants are omitted. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
  Total Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
  Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth  Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth 
Panel A. Young vs. Old Funds 
Young: REL -0.015*** -0.036***  -0.003 -0.011** 
  (0.000) (0.005)  (0.157) (0.018) 
 All Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Strategy and Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
 Observations 11,711 11,711  11,711 11,711 
 R-squared 0.218 0.158  0.119 0.092 
Old:  REL 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.004 
  (0.954) (0.985)  (0.828) (0.128) 
 All Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Strategy and Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
 Observations 14,604 14,604  14,604 14,604 
 R-squared 0.282 0.188  0.271 0.202 
Panel B. Small vs. Large Funds 
Small: REL -0.013*** -0.027***  -0.004** -0.011*** 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.033) (0.007) 
 All Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Strategy and Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
 Observations 12,883 12,883  12,883 12,883 
 R-squared 0.215 0.138  0.142 0.106 
Large:  REL 0.002 -0.004  0.154 0.188 
  (0.566) (0.254)  (0.245) (0.131) 
 All Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Strategy and Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
 Observations 13,432 13,432  13,432 13,432 
 R-squared 0.266 0.145  0.218 0.137 
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Table 10. Local Religiosity and Hedge Fund Holdings 
 
This table reports regression results of average total and idiosyncratic risks of stocks held by hedge funds, holdings-based portfolio total and idiosyncratic risks, and the industry 
concentration of hedge fund portfolios on local religiosity in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Strategy and year fixed effects are included in all of the regressions. All of the variables 
are defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 Panel A. Average Risk of Stocks Held  Panel B. Holdings-based Portfolio Risk  Panel C. Industry Concentration of Portfolio 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Average  
Total Risk 
Average  
Idiosyncratic Risk  
Holdings-based 
Portfolio Total Risk 
Holdings-based  
Portfolio Idiosyncratic Risk 
 Industry  
Herfindahl Index KSZ Index 
REL -0.024*** -0.019***  -0.043
*** -0.041***  -0.208*** -0.191*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_fund_assets 0.149*** 0.095***  0.110
*** 0.106***  0.146 0.338** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.416) (0.015) 
log_firm_assets -0.257*** -0.216***  -0.129
*** -0.133***  -1.476*** -1.129*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_advance_notice 0.007*** 0.006***  0.004
*** 0.003***  0.011*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.003) 
log_minimum_investment 0.000 0.001** -0.000 -0.001***  -0.010*** -0.006*** 
(0.125) (0.025) (0.152) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.003) 
management_fee 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***  0.015** 0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.015) (0.006) 
incentive_fee -0.000 -0.000  -0.000
** -0.000***  -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.522) (0.993)  (0.017) (0.005)  (0.171) (0.305) 
high_watermark 0.002 0.001  0.006
*** 0.005***  0.052*** 0.040*** 
 (0.181) (0.254)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_lockup 0.001*** 0.001***  0.000 0.000  -0.004
* -0.000 
 (0.004)   (0.179) (0.998)  (0.054) (0.890) 
hurdle_rate -0.004** -0.002**  0.001 0.001  0.019
** 0.015** 
 (0.013) (0.047)  (0.595) (0.127)  (0.038) (0.029) 
leverage -0.006*** -0.005***  -0.004
*** -0.002***  0.025*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002) 
audit 0.005*** 0.004***  0.003
*** 0.003***  0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
age 0.001*** 0.001***  0.000 -0.000  0.005
*** 0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.101) (0.437)  (0.009) (0.028) 
edu 0.001*** 0.000***  -0.000
*** -0.000***  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
log_income -0.026*** -0.021***  0.008
** 0.016***  0.129*** 0.123*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.011) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
50 
 
log_ttlpop 0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.000
*  0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.620) (0.837)  (0.991) (0.090)  (0.001) (0.000) 
mf 0.075*** 0.060***  0.007 -0.013
*  0.130 0.073 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.442) (0.067)  (0.153) (0.287) 
minor -0.005 -0.005  -0.030
*** -0.025***  -0.319*** -0.219*** 
 (0.505) (0.402)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
marr 0.001 0.001  -0.013 -0.003  -0.487
*** -0.321** 
 (0.983) (0.971)  (0.550) (0.883)  (0.004) (0.017) 
Constant 0.270*** 0.234***  -0.003 -0.074
***  -0.880*** -1.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.908) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Strategy and Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 5,983 5,983  6,347 6,347  6,425 6,425 
R-squared 0.511 0.458  0.456 0.271  0.129 0.121 
 
